Design and Implementation of RADIUS – An Network Security Protocol by Rehman, Md. Hashmathur et al.
P a g e  | 48    Vol. 10 Issue 7 Ver. 1.0 September 2010 Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology 
 
 
 
GJCST Computing Classification  
                      C 2.0, D 4.6 
Design and Implementation of RADIUS – An 
Network Security Protocol 
Md. Hashmathur Rehman1 Dr.A. Govardhan2 T. Venkat Narayana Rao3 
Abstract-RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial in User 
Service) is a protocol used for authentication, authorization 
and accounting of network objects in networking environment. 
The protocol has set of weaknesses due to its implementation. 
First the overview presents the basic operation and functioning 
of RADIUS protocol. Then analysis part focuses on 
Vulnerability issues such as Security, transport and 
implementation. Finally, how to minimize or resolve various 
issues of the RADIUS protocol using deployment best practices 
and extensions are discussed. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
emote Authentication Dial in User Service (RADIUS) 
is an AAA (authentication, authorization and 
accounting) protocol for applications such as network access 
or IP mobility. It is commonly used for network devices 
such as routers, modem servers, switches, etc. RADIUS is 
currently the de-facto standard for remote authentication and 
accounting. There are many Vulnerability issues with 
RADIUS; these issues can be viewed as security issues, 
transport issues and implementation issues. RADIUS 
consistently provides some level of protection against a 
sniffing, active attacker, but it indicates that the RADIUS 
protocol still exist several leaks. It makes up the security 
shortcomings of RADIUS protocol to a certain extent and 
makes the RADIUS system meet the requirement of 
application. The rest of the paper is presented as follows. 
Section II gives the overview of RADIUS protocol and 
presents basic security mechanism used by the protocol. 
Section III analyses the RADIUS protocol, focusing in 
security, transport and implementation issues. However it 
does not cover RADIUS protocol‘s accounting functionality. 
Section IV presents the concrete implementation of the 
extended RADIUS. Finally, the paper concludes in section 
V 
II. PROTOCOL OVERVIEW 
A. Basic Information 
The newest RADIUS protocol is described in RFC 2865[1], 
"Remote Authentication Dial-in User Service (RADIUS)," 
and RFC 2866[2], "RADIUS Accounting".  RADIUS  
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protocol is used between two servers. RADIUS server is a 
shared authentication server that has a list of valid clients. 
There is a shared secret between the RADIUS server and 
these clients. This secret cannot be empty, but otherwise it is 
not defined by the protocol standard how strong it must be. 
It is only recommended that it is 16 octets minimum and 
unguessable. This secret is used for to authenticate the 
RADIUS server to the NAS and to hide the user password. 
For these purposes the secret is part of value that is hashed 
and the hash value is sent. [5]. RADIUS server also has a 
database of users containing their passwords, possible other 
requirements for these users to gain access and 
configuration data. According to information in this 
database the RADIUS server accepts or rejects the request 
or sends a challenge to user. RADIUS server can also act as 
a proxy relaying requests to other RADIUS server and to 
NAS [5], [15]. When acting as proxy RADIUS server relays 
messages between the NAS and other RADIUS server. 
There can be many RADIUS servers as proxies between the 
NAS and the RADIUS server that finally handles the 
authentication and authorization of the request.     Network 
Access Server (NAS) acts as a client to the RADIUS server. 
Users call in and NAS prompts for needed authentication 
information, for example user name and password. The 
NAS then can use RADIUS server for user authentication. 
When doing so the NAS sends request to the RADIUS 
server containing attributes that have information about user 
that the RADIUS server needs. When sending request 
containing user password, the password is not sent as clear-
text, instead it is encrypted as described in section 4. NAS 
then waits for reply from the RADIUS server. Server can 
accept or reject the request or present a challenge for the 
user to respond. If request is accepted the server can also 
provide the NAS with configuration data and type of service 
granted for the user. If RADIUS server does not response in 
given time, NAS can retransmit the request or it can also use 
possible alternate RADIUS servers. In figure 1 basic 
RADIUS system architecture operation is shown in Figure 1 
[5], [6], and [9]. 
RADIUS protocol uses UDP as its means of transport. UDP 
port assigned for RADIUS protocol is 1812. Previously 
RADIUS used UDP port 1645, but usage of this port 
conflicted with datametrics service. Choice for using UDP 
instead of TCP is mainly for the reason that UDP is lighter 
protocol than more reliable TCP. RADIUS is a stateless 
protocol that does not carry much data as maximum size for 
UDP packet 4096 octets. As RADIUS is used for user 
authentication, few seconds delay is acceptable. In addition 
to complete the authentication and authorization does not 
R 
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need many RADIUS messages to be sent. Therefore choice 
for UDP over TCP is justified [7]. [8], [5].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. AAA client-to-RADIUS server relationship 
 
References [1] and [2] define the following RADIUS 
message types: Access-Request, Access-Accept, Access-
Reject, Access-Challenge, Accounting-Request, and 
Accounting- Response. Figure 2 shows a typical sequence 
diagram of RADIUS protocol when a user accesses the 
network through NAS and disconnects itself. 
 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Typical RADIUS sequence diagram. 
 
A RADIUS message consists of a RADIUS header and 
RADIUS attributes. Each RADIUS attribute specifies a 
piece of information about the connection attempt and is 
described  by variable length attribute-length-value 3-tuples. 
RADIUS attributes are described in RFCs, [1], [2], 2867[3], 
2868[4], 2869[5], and 3162[6]. 
 
A summary of the RADIUS packet is below (from the RFC): 
0                   1                   2                   3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
|     Code      |  Identifier   |            Length             | 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
|                                                               | 
|                         Authenticator                         | 
|                                                               | 
|                                                               | 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
| Attributes... 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- 
The code establishes the type of RADIUS packet. The codes are: 
 
Value  Description Value  Description 
1  Access-Request 11  Access-Challenge 
2  Access-Accept 12  Status-Server (experimental) 
3  Access-Reject 13  Status-Client (experimental) 
4  Accounting-Request 255  Reserved 
5 Accounting-Response ------------------------------------------------ 
   
 
The identifier is a one octet value that allows the RADIUS 
client to match a RADIUS response with the correct 
outstanding request. The attributes section is where an 
arbitrary number of attribute fields are stored [11], [12]. The 
only pertinent attributes for this discussion are the User-
Name and User-Password attributes. This description will  
 
 
Concentrate on the most common type of RADIUS 
exchange: An Access-Request involving a username and  
user password, followed by either an Access-Accept,  
Access-Reject or a failure. I will refer to the two participants 
in this protocol as the client and the server. The client is the 
entity that has authentication information that it wishes to 
validate. The server is the entity that has access to a 
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database of authentication information that it can use to 
validate the client's authentication request.  
B.  Authentication and Authorization 
When NAS wishes to authenticate user via RADIUS, the 
NAS sends Access-Request packet to RADIUS server. To 
this packet the NAS set appropriate attributes that describe 
the needed information about the user and the service 
required to the RADIUS server. User password in User-
Password attribute is sent encrypted and not in clear-text. 
The NAS also generates unique Request Authenticator for 
this request and sets Identifier so that the NAS can connect 
the reply to this request. [10], [13].   
Upon receiving this request the RADIUS server checks it's 
list of valid clients that it has a shared secret with. If the 
request does not come from a client in this list, the request is 
not handled and no error message is sent. If the client is 
valid, the RADIUS server decrypts the user password (if 
present) and checks it's user database for entry for 
requesting user and checks whether user passwords 
match.[6], [5]. 
If user is not found, passwords do not match or the user is 
not allowed to specific clients or ports that may be defined 
listed in user entry, the RADIUS server send Access-Reject 
packet to the client. If user is found, passwords are equal, 
user is allowed to access and no challenge/response is 
needed, then Access-Accept packet is sent to the client. [3], 
[4], [5]. 
For any response Response Authenticator is calculated for 
this packet and Identifier is identical to that of the request. 
The Access-Accept packet can have additional information 
about configuration values in attributes. Access-Reject 
packet in the other hand can only have attribute hat contains 
a text message to be shown to the user. Figure 3 shows 
RADIUS authentication and authorization procedure [11]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
Figure 3: RADIUS authentication procedure. 
 
 
 
When the NAS receives the reply, it matches the reply to the 
request using the Identifier. Then the NAS calculates 
Response Authenticator for received reply the same way the 
RADIUS server did and compares this value to Response 
Authenticator in the message. If these match the the 
RADIUS server is authenticated and the integrity of the 
reply is verified [4]. All the fields of the reply (with Request 
Authenticator in place of Response Authenticator that is 
being calculated) and attributes of the reply are concatenated 
with the shared secret and hash value of this concatenation 
is the Response Authenticator. The Response Authenticator 
can therefore be used for checking the integrity and to 
authenticate the RADIUS server, as any change in the 
message or mismatched shared secret, and the values would 
not match [5]. RADIUS protocol support also additional 
challenge/response authentication. In this method the 
RADIUS server, after receiving Access-Request and having 
checked the user information from user database, sends 
Access-Challenge packet to the client. This packet may have 
an attribute that is message to be displayed to the user. [5] 
When the NAS receives Access-Challenge packet, it 
displays the message to the user (if message is present in the 
attributes) and waits for user's response to this challenge. 
After user has responded, the NAS resends the original 
Access-Request packet with new identifier and the users 
response encrypted in User-Password attribute. If the NAS 
does not support this challenge/response scheme, it will 
regard Access-Challenge as Access-Reject [4], [5]. 
RADIUS server then again checks from it's user database if 
the response to the challenge was correct. If not, then 
Access-Reject packet is send. If response was correct, the 
RADIUS server can send Access-Accept or new Access-
Challenge packet. In figure 3 can RADIUS 
challenge/response operation be seen. [5].  With this 
challenge/response method RADIUS protocol can use 
special devices such as one-time-password generators or 
smart cards to enforce stronger authentication for dial-in 
users. This enhances RADIUS authentication strength 
because new innovation in this field can be added as part of 
RADIUS user authentication process [4]. 
III. ACCOUNTING 
RADIUS accounting is done almost the same way as 
RADIUS authentication and authorization. 
There are some differences. RADIUS accounting uses the 
UDP port 1813. There are also two RADIUS message codes 
and 12 attributes for RADIUS accounting. In addition 
Request Authenticator is calculated differently when using 
RADIUS accounting [6]. Accounting starts with the NAS 
sends RADIUS packet with code Accounting-Request 
having Acct-Status-Type attribute for Start to the RADIUS 
server. In the accounting start request, the attributes 
containing information about the user and service being 
used. All attributes that can be used in Access-Request can 
also be used in Accounting-Request with five exceptions. 
These are User-Password, CHAP-Password, Reply-
Message, State and CHAP-Challenge attributes [6].When 
the NAS wishes to stop the accounting, it sends RADIUS 
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packet with code Accounting-Request having Acct-Status-
Type attribute for Stop to the RADIUS server. This packet 
can have attributes containing information about the service 
that was used and statistics of the use [6], [3]. Having 
received a request packet the RADIUS server then records 
the Accounting-Request and after successfully recording the 
packet acknowledges it by sending Accounting-Response 
packet to the NAS. If the request is not successfully 
recorded, then no acknowledgment is sent. If the NAS does 
not get acknowledgment for its request, it will retransmit the 
request or transmit the request to other RADIUS server. In 
Accounting-Response packet there are no attributes, except 
for possible Proxy-State and Vendor-Specific. Figure 4 
shows operation of RADIUS accounting [6]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: RADIUS accounting. 
In Accounting-Request packet the generation of Request 
Authenticator is different from the generation of Request 
Authenticator in Access-Request packet. In Access-Request 
the Request Authenticator is random number, but in 
Accounting-Request packet the Request Authenticator a 
hash value so that it will protect the integrity of the request. 
Accounting-Request Request  Authenticator is MD5 hash 
over concatenation of Code, Identifier, Length, 16 zero 
octets, attributes in the request and secret shared between 
the NAS and the RADIUS server[3], [6] . Response 
Authenticator in Accounting-Response packet is calculated 
the same way as described for Response Authenticator in 
section 2.2  [6]. 
A. Security Measures 
Firstly, to provide security for RADIUS messages, the 
RADIUS client and the RADIUS server are configured with 
a common shared-secret, which is never sent over the 
network... 
Secondly, the RADIUS protocol adopts Authenticator 
mechanism. The Authenticator authenticates the reply from 
the RADIUS server to the NAS and is also used in 
encryption of User-Password attribute. Two different kinds 
of Authenticator fields are defined. Request Authenticator is 
the name of the Authenticator field in Access-Request type 
packets. It is a random number that the NAS generates in 
order to be able to authenticate that the reply is intended 
exactly for the request that the Request Authenticator was 
generated for. Therefore it must be unique and 
unpredictable. NAS also uses Request Authenticator when 
encrypting User- 
Password attribute. Response Authenticator is the name of 
the Authenticator field in Access-Accept, Access-Reject and 
Access-Challenge type packets. Its value is calculated by the 
RADIUS server. Equation (1) shows formula for Response 
Authenticator. 
Response 
Authenticator=MD5(Code+Identifier+Length+Request
Authenticator+Attributes+Shared Secret)                                                            
      …………………………………… (1)  
Thirdly, user password in User-Password attribute is 
encrypted by stream-cipher. Encryption is done as follows. 
First password is divided to 16 octet segments, padded is not 
multiple of 16. So a number of 16 octet segments are gained, 
now denoted as p1, p2... Then MD5 [13], [14] hash is 
calculated over concatenation the secret shared between the 
NAS and the RADIUS server and the Request Authenticator 
result now denoted as b1. Then p1 and b1 are XORed, the 
result denoted as c(1). c(1) is the placed as the first 16 octets 
of the User-Password attribute. For all values of pi, i greater 
than 2, MD5 hash is calculated over concatenation the secret 
shared between the NAS and the RADIUS server and c(i-1) 
and h(i) is gained. Then pi and bi are XORed and c(i) is the 
result. Finally the User-Password attribute contains 
concatenation of all c(1) to c(i) values.  
 
b1=MD5(S+RA) c(1)=p1 xor b1 
b2=MD5(S+c(1)) c(2)=p2 xor b2 
… 
bi=MD5(S+c(i-1)) c(i)=pi xor bi 
c=c(1)+c(2)+c(i) (2). 
IV.  RADIUS ISSUES 
The RADIUS protocol has a set of vulnerabilities that are 
either caused by the protocol or caused by poor 
implementation and exacerbated by the protocol [7]. 
A. Protocol Dependent Issues 
 According to the protocol, a RADIUS server will 
not validate Access-Request packet really 
originated by RADIUS client before (and even 
after, if packet has no User-Password attribute) 
decoding all attributes, that is to say, RADIUS 
access requests need not be authenticated and 
integrity protected. It opens a packets. And it will 
make User-Password based password attack 
possible. 
 The RADIUS hiding mechanism uses the RADIUS 
shared-secret, the Request  Authenticator, and the 
MD5 hashing algorithm to encrypt the User-
Password and other sensitive attributes. This is a 
well-known issue stated in [1]. MD5 is not 
designed to be a stream cipher primitive; it is 
designed to be a cryptographic hash [13], [14]. This 
sort of misuse of cryptographic primitives often 
leads to subtly flawed systems. It makes User-
Password attribute based shared-secret attack and 
user-password based password attack easy. 
 RADIUS encrypts only the password in the access-
request packet, from the client to the server. The 
remainder of the packet is in the clear. Other 
information, such as username, authorized services, 
and accounting, could be captured by a third party. 
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The matter will be even worse when dealing with 
plaintext password authentication (such as 
Password Authentication Protocol, PAP). 
 
 There is also problem with some vendor-specific 
RADIUS authentication  implementation. For 
example Microsoft has its specific attributes 
defined in RFC 2548[8]. These attributes allow 
MS-CHAP and MS-CHAPv2 authentication via 
RADIUS. Microsoft doesn‘t use some 
cryptographic schema for its MS-CHAP-Challenge, 
MS-CHAP-Response and MS-CHAP2-Response 
attribute [9]. This opens possibility of both replay 
and spoof attack against MS-CHAP and MS-
CHAPv2 authentication. There is design flow in 
this scenario which makes it vulnerable against 
Man-in-the-Middle attack. 
 The RADIUS protocol does not offer replay attack 
prevention. An old packet can be replayed without 
detection by a malicious NAS impersonator. This 
can result in denial of service(DoS) if the server 
limits concurrent sessions for a user. Duplicate 
accounting messages can also create havoc. A 
malicious RADIUS server impersonator can replay 
response message to NAS too. 
 The RADIUS protocol offers only hop-by-hop 
security and has no facility for securing Attribute-
Value pairs between the NAS and the RADIUS 
server. This offers proxy servers the opportunity to 
collect confidential information or modify 
messages without detection by the endpoints. 
 The RADIUS protocol does not allow a server to 
send unsolicited messages to the NAS. Where 
server initiated actions are needed, vendors are 
forced into solutions outside of the RADIUS 
protocol or solutions involving proprietary 
extensions to the RADIUS protocol in ways that 
often compromise interoperability. 
 RADIUS runs on UDP, with no defined 
retransmission or accounting record retention 
policy, and according to the protocol, the NAS 
cannot distinguish the cause of the failure from 
RADIUS server. After several times (can be 
configured) retransmissions, the RADIUS protocol 
specifies that messages are silently discarded for a 
variety of error conditions. If the messages are 
Accounting-Request, silent discarding may cause 
RADIUS server lose user‘s accounting message. In 
addition, the connectionless nature of UDP means 
that one spoofed UDP packet is often enough for an 
attacker. 
B.  Implementation Dependent Issues 
 Request Authenticator in Access-Request packet is 
a 128-bit quantity intended to be unpredictable and 
pseudo-random. But bad implementations do not 
create Request Authenticators that are sufficiently 
random. It opens possibility to spoof RADIUS 
client Access-Request. It is possible for an attacker 
with the ability to capture traffic between the 
RADIUS client and server, and to attempt network 
access to create a dictionary of RADIUS Request 
Authenticators and the corresponding key stream 
used to encrypt the User-Password and other 
attributes. And it can lead to Access-Accept/Reject 
replay and bring DoS. 
 In many RADIUS installations, the same shared 
secret is used to protect many RADIUS client-
server pairs, and many implementations only allow 
shared secrets and user-passwords that are ASCII 
characters, and less than 16 characters resulting the 
RADIUS shared-secrets and user-passwords does 
not have sufficient randomness to prevent a 
successful offline dictionary attack. For a guess of 
the RADIUS shared-secret, the Response 
Authenticator field and the contents of the 
Message-Authenticator attribute are easily 
computed. Offline dictionary attack on RADIUS 
shared-secrets can be easy. 
 In some cases RADIUS may allow privilege 
escalation: for example user can try to login to 
NAS via telnet and change Service-Type attribute 
of Access-Request packet from login to framed to 
be authenticated by RADIUS. Everything depends 
on RADIUS and NAS configuration (the good 
practice for RADIUS server is always send back 
Service-Type attribute). If Access-Accept doesn‘t 
contain Service-Type attribute or NAS doesn‘t 
check it, user can login via telnet. 
 According to [1], each RADIUS packet can be up 
to 4096 bytes. It allows putting > 2000 attributes 
into a single packet. Most implementations of 
RADIUS servers allocate maximum attribute 
length for each attributes, it means for each 
attributes > 256 bytes of memory will be allocated. 
Therefore, it is possible to lock >512K of memory 
and amount of CPU time with a single 4K packet. 
It opens a possibility to spoof source IP for this 
kind of packets. This is a major weakness in 
RADIUS protocol rather then all hard-to-exploit 
cryptographic Man-in-the-Middle issues. Coupled 
with the spoofing of Access-Request packets with 
no Message-Authenticator attribute, this may be 
serious. 
 Some of current RADIUS server implementations 
are derived from Cistron. And most of them have 
buffer overflow in digest calculation. Probably this 
overflow can only lead to DoS. Since overflow 
occurs before packet is checked, it can be exploited 
from spoofed IP. 
 The RADIUS server has local root exploits if its 
configuration files had open write permissions. So 
the system is vulnerable to insider attacks. A 
common way to protect a static encryption key is to 
save it in a file with restricted access. However, it 
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is inadequate to prevent a super-user privilege from 
accessing the static key in its hosting file. 
V. RADIUS IMPLEMENTATION AND EXTENSIONS 
To address RADIUS issues when deploying a RADIUS 
solution, the following deployment can be used: 
 
A. Deployment Best Practices 
 Use cryptographically strong Request 
Authenticators. The Request Authenticator value 
must be changed each time a new Identifier is used. 
 Allow the configuration and use of shared-secrets 
and user-passwords consisting of a random 
sequence at least 32 hexadecimal digits long or 22 
keyboard characters long including a random 
sequence of upper and lower case letters, numbers, 
and punctuation. Ideally, the shared-secrets and 
userpasswords should be computer-generated. Use 
a different shared-secret for each server- client pair. 
 Check the sizes of attributes or messages properly, 
and ignore inconsistent attributes result in the 
message. To solve the problem that a single 
RADIUS packet locks too much memory, have 
value-pair with variable size data. 
 Use the Message-Authenticator attribute in all 
Access-Request messages. The access server must 
send Access-Request messages with the Message-
Authenticator attribute and the RADIUS server 
must silently discard the message if the Message-
Authenticator attribute is either not present or fails 
verification [11]. 
 Configure the NAS to send RADIUS Accounting-
Interim-Update attribute. It can keep the accounting 
information up to the point of the last Accounting-
Interim-Update. But this will bring periodic traffic 
between RADIUS client and RADIUS server [4]. 
 Set primary RADIUS server and secondary 
RADIUS server at the same time to realize disaster 
recovery. They can be all in one LAN or not. 
 Limit the number of the same user attempt to login. 
If a user try to login too much times, use lockout 
mechanism to lock its accounting. 
 Disable PAP authentication by default. Use a 
strong CHAP (Challenge Handshake 
Authentication Protocol) challenge when 
implement CHAP authentication. If implement 
MS-CHAP or MSCHAPv2 authentication, do not 
support LAN manager encoding of MS-CHAP 
challenge responses or password changes. 
 Use dynamic user-passwords to gain access. 
RADIUS is capable of using a strong, two-factor 
form of authentication, in which users need to 
possess both a user ID and a hardware or software 
token to gain access. Token-based schemes use 
dynamic passwords. Every minute or so, the token 
generates a unique 4-, 6- or 8-digit access number 
that is synchronized with the security server. To 
gain entry into the system, the user must generate 
both this one-time number and user ID and 
password. 
B. Extensions 
 Design a two server billing mechanism to record 
accounting messages on two RADIUS servers at 
the same time. This makes it easy for ISPs (Internet 
Server Provider) or users to check up if two servers 
have the same accounting records, to avoid some 
cheating. Notice that just authenticate a user on one 
RADIUS server. 
 Add a message to traditional RADIUS protocol to 
achieve the synchronization between RADIUS 
server and client. The message can be 
serverinitiated or client-initiated. It will be used 
when server or NAS want to synchronize with 
another, for example when RADIUS server wants 
to restart.  
 Extend some vendor-specific attributes. For 
example, add Error-Info attribute to record error 
information from RADIUS server, add No-
Account-Info attribute to declare that need not to 
record a user‘s accounting message because it is in 
monthly or yearly packet, add VLAN (Virtual 
Local Area Network) attribute to declare a user in a 
VLAN. If there are new requirements, it‘s 
convenience to add new attribute to the system, but 
pay attention not to bring insecurity factors. 
 The perfect solution is to use it in conjunction with 
IPSec, if RADIUS traffic cross untrusted network. 
If the NAS can support IPSec, then the best thing to 
do is to forsake RADIUS application-layer security 
entirely and to just run RADIUS over IPSec ESP 
with a non-null transform. This is described in 
[6].Unfortunately, many embedded systems do not 
have the horsepower or headroom to run IPSec, so 
RADIUS/IPSec is not widely used today. 
VI. WHY MODIFY RADIUS? 
So, why attempt to modify RADIUS at all? Why not just go 
to another (presumably more modern, more secure) 
protocol? Well, for the most part, the answer is "Because 
such a protocol doesn't currently exist." In the near future, 
however, Diameter is likely to be released by the ETF. 
Diameter is the planned RADIUS replacement. The great 
majority of all the protocol work that has gone into 
Diameter has been directed to removing some of the 
functional limitations imposed by the RADIUS protocol. 
Effectively no work has been done as relates to the 
client/server  security of the protocol [8], [9]. (CMS is 
defined, but this is a security layer for the proxy to proxy  
interaction, not the client to proxy/server interaction)   
So, does this mean that they continue to use even RADIUS's 
ad hoc system? No, they removed  ll security functionality 
from the protocol. They did the protocol designer's 
equivalent of punting. Section 2.2 of the current Diameter 
protocol spec says: 
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"Diameter clients, such as Network Access Servers (NASes) 
and Foreign Agents MUST support IP Security, and MAY 
support TLS. Diameter servers MUST support TLS, but the 
administrator MAY opt to configure IPSec instead of using 
TLS. Operating the Diameter protocol without any security 
mechanism is not recommended."  
So, all security aspects of the protocol are handled by IPSec 
and/or TLS. From a security aspect, his strikes me as a very 
good idea. Both IPSec and TLS are fully featured 
(sometimes too fully featured) protocols that many people 
have reviewed. (That's already much better than RADIUS 
ever did).  
Examining this from a slightly different angle gives me 
some cause for concern, however. It  strikes me that the 
overhead imposed by a full TLS/IPSec implementation is 
very significant for many current-day embedded devices. 
This would seem to indicate that (at least in the near future) 
manufactures are going to either continue to use RADIUS or 
ignore the diameter  standard and perform Diameter without 
TLS or IPSec.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
RADIUS is a widely used AAA protocol because it is 
simple, efficient and easy to implement. This paper provided 
an overview of RADIUS protocol and described how 
RADIUS security issues are addressed or minimized using 
implementation, deployment best practices and extensions. 
These include using strong shared-secrets, the Message-
Authenticator attribute, cryptographic-quality values for the 
Request Authenticator, different shared-secrets for each 
RADIUS client/server pair, and IPSec to provide data 
confidentiality for RADIUS messages, and so on. At the 
same time, many new-world technologies are requiring a 
secure, peer-to-peer, and reliable framework that not only 
has the richness of RADIUS but also the flexibility and 
robustness of Diameter, the next-generation AAA protocol. 
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